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CORPORATE REORGANIZATION AND A MINISTRY
OF JUSTICE
By EDWARD H. LEVI*O F the corporate reorganization chapter of the recently amend-
ed bankruptcy act,' it may be said in brief that it contributes
generally to reorganization practice, makes numerous minor
changes which will be of practical significance in particular cases,
and leaves many problems untouched or further complicated. The
chapter is important in the history of corporate reorganizations,
but it is also important as an example of legislative draftsmanship.
We have seen many changes in the formalities of corporate
reorganization in the past few years.2  No longer is it necessary
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
'Chapter X of the now amended bankruptcy act. The amendments com-
prise the "Chandler Bill," sponsored by Congressman Walter Chandler. The
bill was first introduced on May 28, 1936; it was finally introduced on July
28, 1937, as H. R. 8046. It was signed by the president on June 22, 1938.
The National Bankruptcy Conference did considerable work on the bill, but
chapter X, which concerns us here, went through much revision in the later
forms of the bill, as an analysis of H. R. 12889, introduced on May 28, 1936,
will show (see subsection II of section 12 of that bill) and its preparation
would seem to have been in a more hurried atmosphere. For the background
of the Chandler Bill, see McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to
Amend the Bankruptcy Act, (1937) 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 369. Professor
McLaughlin's valiant fight to change the set-off provisions of the act failed.
The setting for chapter X is shown by the hearings on the bills to establish
a conservator in bankruptcy, hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives on H. R. 9 and H. R. 6963, serial 10, March 30,
1937, as well as by the hearings on the Chandler Bill itself. The following
articles have recently appeared on Chapter X: Gerdes, Corporate Re-
organizations: Changes Effected by Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,
(1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1; Douglas, Improvement in Federal Procedure
for Corporate Reorganizations (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 875; McCaffery, Cor-
porate Reorganization under the Chandler Bankruptcy Act, (1938) 26 Cal.
L. Rev. 643; Heuston, Corporate Reorganizations under the Chandler Act,
(1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1199.
'The articles by Levi and Moore on Bankruptcy and Reorganization in
(1937-1938) 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 219, 398 at least do show some of the
changes.
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to talk about a fair sale when a fair plan is meant.8 In order to
obtain federal and equity receivership jurisdiction, it is no
longer necessary to employ the fiction of the consent receivership
which was so annoying to Judge Bourquin. 4  Three creditors of
the debtor may now file the petition directly in the federal court.
In order to satisfy the demands of dissenters, it is, in the main,
no longer necessary to resort to upset price devices, or possibly
trustee-purchase. 5 Today if the requisite majority of a class of
creditors or stockholders approve a plan of reorganization, the
dissenters are forced in directly. The question of fees for com-
mittees has come, without constitutional difficulties,8 under the
control of the court. And the duty and ability of a court to make
a binding adjudication that a plan is fair has been enacted into
law. These were the main changes accomplished by section 77B
of the bankruptcy Act. Now that section 77B has been superseded
by chapter X, we can say that despite all the changes and prob-
lems which section 77B brought in its wake, the most important
contribution of the section was its treatment of the dissenter prob-
lem. In the main the section aided reorganizers who could not
raise money to pay off dissenters. Thus undoubtedly the most
pressing problem of corporate reorganization during the depres-
sion, the problem which had kept reorganizations from moving,
was met and solved.
Looked upon in this light, section 77B was one step in the
attempt "to introduce democracy into reorganization practice."7 It
3For the older view, see Bowling Green Trust Co. v. Virginia P. and P.
Co., 164 Fed. 753, 755, (C.C. Va. 1908) and see Swaine, Reorganization of
Corporations: Certain Developments of the Past Decade, (1927) 27 Col. L.
Rev. 901. A milepost along the way was Phipps v. Chicago Rock Island &
Pacific Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1922) 284 Fed. 945, 28 A. L. R. 1184, where
it was felt that there need be no sale at all since the plan was fair. For the
history of the development, the essays in Rosenberg, Swaine, Walker, Cor-
porate Reorganization and the Federal Court (1924) are invaluable.
41His language in May Hosiery Mills v. F. W. Grand 5-10-25 Cent
Stores, (D. Mont. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 218, 222, is revealing as to the temper
of the times. In connection with the temper of the remarks it is pleasant to
read Radin, The Good Judge of Chateau-Thierry and His American Coun-
terpart, (1922) 10 Cal. L. Rev. 300. Cf. State ex rel. Merriam v. Ross,
(1894) 122 Mo. 435, 25 S. W. 947.
sKatz, Protection of Minority Bondholders, (1936) 3 U. Chi. L. Rev.
517, gives the best demonstration of these devices. There is an excellent
discussion in Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upset Price in Corporate
Reorganization, (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 132.
6Cf. United States v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., (1931) 282 U. S. 311,
51 Sup. Ct. 159, 75 L. Ed. 359, and note Rodgers and Groom, Reorganization
of Railroad Corporations under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, (1933)
33 Col. L. Rev. 571, 587.
7See Foster, (1933) 43 Yale L. J. 352 (Book Review), but Mr. Foster
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recognized the rights of a majority of a class. But an ill informed,
unorganized and possibly frightened majority may in turn be
led by a powerful and organized minority.8 Under such condi-
tions the real democrats might be dissenters-or at least so some
may say. The next step "in making democracy work" is to see
to it that the majority of the voters are informed, and to set up
various constitutional controls whereby no organized minority
may run the show for itself. Since informing the voters may
be propagandizing them, and controlling the minority presupposes
some person or group which will hold the controls, the charge
will then be made, and often correctly, that we have not more
but less democracy. And the next charge will be that we have
hamstrung the competent, which is not to the best interests of the
majority. This leads to the proposition that we should not have
democracy, or that true democracy is the rule of the competent.
The new chapter is an attempt to provide the means of informing
the voters and to provide controls against an organized minority.
We may expect further attempt to do this in the future. The
charges already have been made that all of this leads to less
democracy, and the question is implicit whether we really want
democracy in our industrial and investment order.9
I
As against the standard of a democratic industrial and invest-
ment order, section 77B appears to have been inadequate in at
least two general ways. Of course, the dissenters were only to be
forced into a plan which the court found to be "fair and equit-
able.""' Adequate protection for all classes of investors requires
that these words have definite content. The problem concerns
not only investors whose rights as to debtors are being modified
through reorganizations. Of course these investors do not have
rather abandons his democratic notions to some extent in Foster, Conflicting
Ideals for Reorganization, (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 923.8
"It is therefore essential, if the general will is to be able to express
itself, that there should be no partial society within the state and that each
citizen should think only his own thoughts ... " Rousseau, The Social
Contract, Book II, chapter IIL
rThus the article by Swaine, "Democratization" of Corporate Reorgani-
zations, (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 256. See also the discussions by Professor
Dodd. The Securities and Exchange Commission's Reform Program for
Bankruptcy Reorganizations, (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 223; Weiner, The
Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Reorganization, (1938)
38 Col. L. Rev. 280; Laporte, Changes in Corporate Procedure Proposed by
the Chandler and Lea Bills, (1938) 51 F-arv. L. Rev. 672.
1077B (f) (1) "it is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly
in favor of any class of creditors or stockholders, and is feasible."
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necessary information as to their rights if their rights are vague
and changing. But the problem concerns the whole investment
market. Securities are not bought intelligently if the position of
these securities in the event of liquidation or reorganization is
hidden. It was somewhat unfortunate for the dissenting class in
particular that under section 77B, unlike the railroad reorganiza-
tion act, the court did not pass upon the fairness of the plan until
majority assents had been secured. The dice were then some-
what loaded not only against dissenters in a class but against
whole dissenting classes. But more important, there was no
clear statement in the act, nor any clearly applicable rule in the
cases, that set forth the minimum requirements of a fair plan.
To be sure there was some development in the cases as to what
constituted a fair plan. But only two things were really made
definite. It was unnecessary to include stockholders or even
creditors in the plan of reorganization if it could be clearly
shown that there was no equity left for them,"' and a plan would
be unfair if it were forced upon the top class of secured creditors
who did not approve the plan by the two-thirds majority. 2
It would be a gross exaggeration to say that plans of reor-
ganization varied enormously because of uncertainty as to legal
rights. Nevertheless it is not clear what treatment an inter-
mediate class may demand in a reorganization. This is another
way of saying that the application of the Boyd Case13 in section
77B, even assuming that the principle of the case applies,' 4 was
uncertain. In the first place there is the still remaining argument
as to whether the Boyd Case applies as among classes of creditors
where the lowest class allowed in the plan is not a class of stock-
holders but of creditors. 15 In the second place there is the un-
"'In re 620 Church Street Bldg. Corp., (1936) 299 U. S. 24, 57 Sup. Ct.
88, 81 L. Ed. 16.12Tennessee Publishing Co. v. American National Bank, (1936) 299
U. S. 18, 57 Sup. Ct. 85, 81 L. Ed. 13. The district court had refused to
confirm the plan and had dismissed the proceedings. The Supreme Court
in affirming refused to discuss the question as to the constitutionality of
77B (b) (5). The plan was "impracticable;" it was also unfair. Certain
provisions were "wholly incomprehensible." But the precedent of a case is
one thing, and the rule of law which it establishes another. We may limit
the Tennessee case to its facts, but the rule of law which it gives effect to
today is much broader.
-
8 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Boyd, (1913) 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct.
554, 57 L. Ed. 931.
14Cf. Matter of New York Railways Corp., (1936) 82 F. (2d) 739
(C.C.A. 2d); Downtown Investment Ass'n v. Boston Metropolitan Build-
ings, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1936) 81 F. (2d) 314; In re Watco Corporation,
(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 245.
lrFrank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Re-
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certainty as to how much the intermediate class may demand,
assuming it may demand something more than the lower class.
Here there is the widest divergence of views ranging from the
notion of merely something more than lower classes get to the
position that the intermediate class is entitled to payment in full
as on liquidation before the lower class is admitted.16 The argu-
ment is colored by the confusion as to whether the Boyd Case
really ought to apply at all where it is fairly certain that there is
no equity for the intermediate class anyway, 17 as was the situation
in the Boyd Case itself.'5 Another way of stating the problem of
the Boyd Case in regard to section 77B is in terms of the Tennes-
see Publishing Co. Case.'9 Will the principle of that case apply
to an intermediate class so that such a class may not be appraised
out if it fails to accept the plan by the two-thirds majority?
Less serious than the problem of the intermediate class are
problems concerning the rights of dissenters within a class.
Despite the provisions for rule of the two-thirds majority under
section 77B, might dissenters defeat a plan of reorganization on
the ground that their class of securities was not sufficiently com-
pensated? Thus may a minority of the class of preferred stock-
holders defeat a plan because common stockholders are to receive
stock of the same priority as preferred stockholders are receiving
-and a majority are willing to receive-for 75 per cent of their
old preferred stock ?., Or may a minority of bondholders or note
organization, (1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 698; Swaine, Reorganization of Corpora-
tions: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 901.
'
8 Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of
Security Holders on Reorganization, (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 127; see
Buschek, A Formula for the Judicial Reorganization of Public Service
Corp., (1935) 32 Col. L. Rev. 964.
17New York Trust Co. v. Continental & Commercial Trust & Savings
Bank, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 26 F. (2d) 872.
'sThis was the reason that Paton's plea had been previously denied when
he attacked the plan. Paton v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. (E.D. Wis.
1896) 85 Fed. 838. "Such contention, if true in fact, would come perilously
near proving that the new shares had been issued without the payment of
any part of the implied stock subscriptions except the $10 and $15 assess-
ments. But there was an entirely different estimate of the value of the road
when the reorganization contract was made" (1912) 228 U. S. 482, 507, 33
Sup. Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931. The Boyd Case is more than twenty-five years
old now, and if we had well drawn reorganization acts, it would be high time
to forget about it.
19(1936) 299 U. S. 18, 57 Sup. Ct. 85, 81 L. Ed. 13.2 0 t has been held they may not. In re Donahoe's, Inc., (D.,C.D. Del.
1937) 19 F. Supp. 441, 443. "The bankers who are furnishing the new
money insist that 135,000 shares be given to the present holders of common
stock, those holders including the new management. The success of the
company and the value of the preferred stock will depend upon the efforts of
the new management." Cf. In re Parker-Young Co., (D.C. N.H. 1936) 15
F. Supp. 965.
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holders defeat a plan of reorganization because their interest is
reduced, while stock is given to stockholders no longer having
any equity ?21 May a minority of any higher class object to giving
stock anticipation warrants to stockholders ?22 Even the prob-
lem of the dissenting first mortgage lien holder causes difficulty
where separate liens are classified together and over the objection
bf the individual lien holder, who is not allowed to foreclose but
is forced into a plan recognizing both unsecured creditors and
stockholders without paying the claim of the dissenter in full.
23
If confusion as to the standards of a fair plan was the first
serious defect of section 77B, the second defect was the failure
of the section to provide adequate means of informing the security
holders as to the plan of reorganization on which they were to
vote, and inadequate devices for controlling the strong minority
which might lead a disorganized, uninformed, and possibly fright-
ened majority. Studies of corporate reorganization have sup-
plied documentation for facts which have been known for some
time.24  The house of issue through its control over the trustee
under the indenture and its control over the formation of com-
mittees may dominate a reorganization so that it emerges again
as underwriter or protects its rights as creditor through control
over the new management or through recognition as a creditor in
the plan in a way denied ordinary mortals. It may be that all
this leads to efficient management, but it is not democracy in the
usual sense. The possibility of committee members who own
conflicting interests, of trustees under indentures who will enforce
their own claims first, and of insiders speculating in the securities
of the debtor, who will be in a position to control publicity, is
usually defended only as a necessary evil. Section 77B did not
compel the house of issue, if it were not the trustee, to disclose its
list of security holders. It did not prevent the court appointed
trustee from being in effect the friendly receiver in a new guise
21It has been held they may. In re Barclay Park Corp., (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1937) 90 F. (2d) 595. In support of the plan it was argued that the land-
lord, who could evict the debtor, would not accept a plan which would ex-
clude the holders of junior securities, and that the stockholders represented
the management which was necessary to the enterprise and which would
"walk out" if the proposed plan did not go through.22See In re Middle West Utilities Co., (N.D. ill. 1935) C. C. H. Bank.
Dec. 3671. and In re New York Railways Corporation, (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1936) 82 F. (2d) 739, 744.
23In re Palisades on the Desplaines, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d)
214.
24Particularly the studies of the Securities and Exchange Commission
on Protective and Reorganization Committees.
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with affiliations close to one of the reorganization protagonists; in
fact it allowed the debtor to remain in possession. It did not
require committee members either to own the securities they
represented or at least to refrain from owning securities in ad-
versary positions. It did not prevent the trustee under the in-
denture from becoming a creditor of the debtor and then enforc-
ing that claim of its own prior to or at least on a par with the
claims it represented. While solution to these problems is not
easy, it may be thought that reasonable safeguards might be
attempted at least.
The contribution which chapter X of the amended bankruptc'y
act makes to the general outline of reorganization practice is
chiefly in an attempt to control the inner processes of reorganiza-
tion by devices for informing security holders and for depriving
minority groups of the overwhelming power they might have to
lead majorities. The basic changes made by chapter X may
be classified under four headings: (1) the trustee, (2) the court,
(3) committees, and (4) the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. As to the trustee, the first thing to be noted is that a
trustee must be appointed where the liquidated and noncontingent
indebtedness of the debtor is $250,000 or over.1 If the indebted-
ness is less than $250,000, the debtor may be allowed to remain in
possession. Second. when a trustee is appointed under the new
chapter, the trustee must be "disinterested" unless there are at least
two trustees, in which case one of them may be a director, officer,
or emplonyee of the debtor with authority to operate the business
during the period fixed by the judge and to file with the court re-
ptrts concerning the operation at such intervals as the court may
designate.*-
"Disinterested" is a word of art under the chapter;27 it is
oJnly defined negatively, however, and presumably the court might
add to its meaning from time to time. Under the act a person is
not disinterested if (1) he is a creditor or stockholder of the
debtor, or (2) is or was an underwriter of any of the outstand-
ing securities of the debtor, or within five years prior to the date
of the filing of the petition was the underwriter of any securities
of the debtor, or (3) is, or was, within two years prior to the date
of the filing of the petition, a director, officer, or employee of the
debtor or any such underwriter, or an attorney for the debtor or
L"Sec. 156.
2' Secs. 156 and 189.27Sec. 158.-
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such underwriter, or (4) it appears that he has, by reason of any
other direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or in-
terest in the debtor or such underwriter, or for any reason, an
interest materially adverse to the interests of any class of credit-
ors or stockholder. The attorney appointed to represent the
trustee must also be disinterested, except for a specified purpose
other than representing the trustee in conducting the proceedings
under the chapter, when the judge has given his approval."
Now three objections have been made to the mandatory ap-
pointment of a disinterested trustee. It has been urged that the
disinterested trustee will not be sufficiently well acquainted with
the debtor's business-that only an interested trustee, presum-
ably an officer of the debtor corporation, will be sufficiently well
acquainted to conduct the debtor's business efficiently and retain
the good will that the debtor may have. This argument over-
looks the fact that the section specifically provides that "a trustee
or debtor in possession may employ officers of the debtor at rates
of compensation to be approved by the court."2' There is no reason
to believe that the officers will not be retained, and if they are
retained, and if the trustee is competent, the fact that the trustee
is an outsider may well be of definite advantage. The second
argument seems to have more validity. It is argued that in many
cases the expense of a disinterested trustee will not be warranted.
This is somewhat answered by the provision that there need be no
trustee if the indebtedness is not $250,000. It must be admitted
that there probably will be cases where an independent trustee is
appointed where his services to this debtor corporation do not
warrant the expense to the creditors. The justification for this
must be that it is salutary for reorganizations by and large to
have independent trustees.
There should be some provision therefore whereby in a given
case the court ought to be allowed to pay the expense of the
trustee from a general fund, collected either from court costs or
appropriated for that purpose by the legislature, with the recogni-
tion that the purpose of the trustee requirement is to raise the level
of reorganization practices in general, and the expense in a given
case should not be carried by the estate. In fact one of the main
purposes of bankruptcy legislation is to raise the economic morality
of the community. General provisions are therefore required, but
2 8 Sec. 157.
29Sec. 191.
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their expense should not always be carried by the particular
litigants.
A third argument against the mandatory appointment of a
disinterested trustee has to do both with the general competence
of the trustee appointed and the requirement that the trustee
"shall report to the judge any facts ascertained by him pertaining
to fraud, misconduct, mismanagement, and irregularities, and to
any causes of action available to the estate."3 It is thought that
the trustee will be vindictive, make unfounded charges of fraud,
and will further the assumption that the debtor was always negli-
gent or worse. There is little to justify this assumption. Trustees
in the past, possibly because they were interested, .have been if
anything too lax. And a competent trustee might well insulate
the management from unfounded attacks. The problem is to ob-
tain competent trustees, and this is a problem which it is the duty
of the federal courts to solve. The arguments against having
one competent group of trustees to which all cases are referred
never have seemed convincing.:
It should be noted that the mandatory appointment of a some-
what disinterested trustee is not a new step in reorganization law.
Under section 77, the railroad reorganization act, the appoint-
ment of a trustee is mandatory, and the selection of the trustee is
subject to the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
There the trustee must not have been connected with the debtor
during the last year, unless there is an additional trustee who was
not so connected, or the operating revenues of the road during
the past year were under $1,000,000Y." In addition the trustee
under section 77, as under chapter X, is directed to report charges
of misconduct which may give the debtor a cause of action. 3
Not only is the trustee mandatory in many cases under chapter
X, and required to be disinterested in most, but the position of the
trustee is radically changed. The trustee is to prepare the plan
of reorganization or to report to the court why a plan cannot be
effected." This a radical change. Creditors and stockholders
,"Sec. 167.
.roSce the testimony of David Teitelbaum, Hearings before the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, June, 1937, p. 105, on H. R. 6439 and H. R. 8046.
This is really the main problem. We will have to develop a class of pro-
fessional and competent trustees. It is unfortunate that the act against a
person or firm having a monopoly on the trustee appointments has not
been repealed. 11 U. S. C. A. S. 76a.
:',Sec. 77 (c) (1).33Sec. 77 (c) (9).
34Sec. 169. In the hearings referred to in note 31, Congressman Celler
stated: "Between you and me, it does not make a bit of difference who
proposes the plan . . ." (p. 173).
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may submit suggestions or plans to the trustee,3 5 but the trustee
must actively prepare the plan. Apparently on the hearing of
the plan, any debtor, creditor, or stockholder may propose amend-
ments or may offer other plans, but it is clear that the act contem-
plates that the trustee will occupy the central position. The
advantage of this method of preparation of the plan is that the
court ought to be able to be informed of what is actually going
on, and the inclusion of provisions unduly favorable to some
special interest may not go unseen so frequently. The disadvantage
is that security holders are partially removed from the struggle
and compromise which would seem to be the only way that parties
may feel satisfied with the ultimate result. A wise trustee, how-
ever, through' consultation with the parties in interest, may at
times merely act as an arbitrator allowing the parties to fight
their own battles. The danger of this, of course, is that the trad-
ing will go on just as before without anything gained by the
presence of an inactive trustee.
Where the debtor is allowed to remain in possession, the court
may appoint a special examiner to prepare the plan, and plans may
be filed by creditors, stockholders if the debtor is .not insolvent,
and by the debtor. 6 Since the debtor in possession is to perform
the functions of the trustee, save for the preparation of the plan,
it would appear that the debtor is also under obligations to in-
vestigate itself.
The position of the court has been changed under chapter X
by placing more responsibility on the court, and by an attempt to
make it more likely that the court will be more aware of the mind
of the ordinary creditor. The most important change is the adop-
tion of the practice utilized in section 773- of having the court
pass on the fairness of the plan prior to any vote by security hold-
ers.3 1 In practice, however, this may only operate to substitute
for the feeling that the plan is presumptively fair because approved
by a majority the feeling that the plan is probably fair if it has been
drawn up by the trustee.
The power of committees to dominate the proceedings is greatly
reduced. Committees may not solicit acceptances to a plan of re-
organization until after an order approving the plan and the trans-
mittal of the plan to creditors and stockholders." This does not
35Sec. 167.36Sec. 168.37Sec. 77 (e).3USec. 174.3 9Sec. 176. They may do so before the order approving th plan if the
court gives its consent.
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mean that committees must be inactive during the earlier stages.
Section 209 explicitly provides that a creditor or stockholder may
act in a proceeding under this chapter in person, by an attorney
at law, or by a duly authorized agent or committee. But before
a committee may represent more than twelve stockholders or credi-
tors, a statement must be filed with the court giving information
about the membership of the committee, the claims owned by them
and when they were acquired, and a copy of the instrument of
authority:- In so far as these requirements may be burdensome,
they favor the large institutional investor who will be able to make
his influence felt without a committee representing twelve credi-
tors."t Under the provisions of section 213, no agent, indenture
trustee or committee will be allowed to intervene or to be heard
until they have "satisfied the court that they have complied with
all applicable laws regulating the activities and personnel of such
persons." This may have reference to state regulatory acts, such
as in New York, Michigan and California,42 but it also leaves the
way open for further federal legislation."t
The power of one committee to dominate the entire proceedings
is also reduced through the increase in the importance of the court
appointed trustee. Nevertheless, the committee may be of great
utility. It may advise the court on the selection of a trustee; it
may supervise the management of the estate, and in this respect
the committee will be aided by the reports which the trustee must
submit. The form of these reports may be "recommended" by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.'
4
Speculation by members of committees will be curbed by sec-
tion 249, which legalizes the practice of some courts under section
77B.'r
"No compensation shall be allowed to any committee or at-
torney or any other person acting in the proceeding in a representa-
tive or fiduciary capacity, who at any time after assuming to act
in such a capacity has purchased or sold such claims or stock, or
bv whom or for whose account such claims or stock have without
the prior consent or subsequent approval of the court, been other-
wise acquired or transferred."
4OSec. 211. The provisions are also applicable to indenture trustees.
41See Brandeis, Other People's Money.
42These acts are discussed in Levi and Moore, Bankruptcy and Re-
organization, (1938) 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 236.
43Such as the Lea Bill, H. R. 6968, which would regulate committees,
and the Barkley Bill, H. R. 2344, which would regulate trustees under
indentures.44Sec. 190.4rIn re Paramount Publix Corp.. (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1936) C. C. H. Dec.
3987; In re Republic Gas Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1936) C. C. H. 4104.
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In line with reducing the power of committees, is the broad
right to be heard which is granted under chapter X. The right
to be heard is now clearly distinguished from the right to inter-
vene. "The debtor, the indenture trustees, and any creditor or
stockholders of the debtor" now has the right to be heard on all
matters arising in the proceeding. 40 The inclusion of the inden-
ture trustee is to be noted. The right to intervene itself is only
stated in permissive terms,47 but it may be interpreted to give an
absolute right to intervene in certain instances in accordance with
rule 24 of the federal rules of civil procedure.
The organization of security holders among themselves is made
easier by the requirement that the trustee prepare a list of security
holders and requiring anyone having such a list to produce it.4,
The position of the Securities and Exchange Commission with
respect to the proceedings is the fourth great change wrought by
the new chapter. After a plan has been proposed by the trustee
or by other permissible parties where the debtor is left in posses-
sion, and there has been a hearing on ihe plan, the judge must, if
the indebtedness of the debtor exceeds $3,000,000, and may if
the indebtedness is less, decide what plan or plans are worthy of
consideration and report this plan or plans to the Securities and
Exchange Commission for "examination and report. ' 40  In the
event of such a submission of a plan to the Commission, the court
cannot proceed further until there has been a report by the com-
mission, or notification to the effect that there will be no report,
or reasonable time has elapsed after the submission to the com-
mission,5 0 even though the debtor's indebtedness was less than
$3,000,000, and the submission to the commission was therefore
voluntary. The report of the commission is only advisory, and
the plan is not to be submitted to security holders until approved
4GSec. 206. During the hearings there was a great deal of conversation
concerning the provision that "The Judge may, for cause shown, permit a
labor union, or employees' association, representative of employees of the
debtor, to be heard on the economic soundness of the plan affecting the
interests of the employees." But the provision is unimportant, although it
is as Mr. Douglas said, "A modest beginning." Mr. Michener was con-
siderably troubled by the idea. Hearings, 191.47Sec. 207. The subject of intervention in proceedings in the federal
courts is supposed to be covered in the articles in (1936) 45 Yale L. J. 565
and (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 898. The absolute right to intervene is granted
a trustee under an indenture in Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v.
Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Co. (C.C.A. 3d Cir. Oct. 14, 1935)







by the court."' On the other hand whatever report is made by
the commission, or a summary of the report prepared by the coin-
mission itself, must be submitted to the security holders along
with the plan when the plan is submitted to the security holders
for their vote.,"
The potential effect of such a report is obvious. It may be
supposed that as a practical matter the commission ordinarily
will only submit a report which points out possible advantages
and disadvantages in proposed plans as various security holders
are affected." But the ability of the commission to damn a plan
effectively will be such that reorganizers may well be more wary
as to the plans which they will attempt to get the trustee to sub-
mit. The limits of the powers of the commission in making its
"examination and report" is open to question. A previous draft
of the chapter had allowed the commission to make an "investiga-
tion, examination, and report.""1  May the commission subpoena
witnesses and books in its efforts to gain the facts? It seems
probable that it may not. Its activities probably are limited to
indicating in its report the want of sufficient facts for it or se-
curity holders to make an intelligent appraisal of the submitted
plan.
The power of the commission in reorganizations is also en-
hanced because not only must it be given notice of all steps taken
in connection with the proceedings, together with copies of most
if the important orders entered or papers filed," but it must
appear in the proceedings if requested to do so by the judge and
it may on its own motion if approved by the judge."G It apparently
has no absolute right to intervene, and even when admitted though
deemed to be an intervener, it does not have the right to appeal-
which is somewhat anomalous."
It is theoretically possible but beyond all probability that the
court might see fit to disregard not only an unfavorable report
by the commission but also a resulting failure to secure the re-
quired majority of votes from security holders. The revised
r'Sec. 174. A possible interpretation, however, is that the judge must
approve at least one plan. It does not say "if any."
",
2Sec. 175.
.'44n the manner of the majority report of the Commission on the Re-
organization Plan for International Paper and Power Co., Holding Company
Act Release No. 641, May 5, 1937.5"1. R. 6439, sec. 12. subsec. 11 (d) (7).
• -Sec. 265a.
• C6Sec. 208.
T,:And note the limitation as to fees. Sec. 242 (3).
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act includes the ambiguous provision of the present act, which
never has been successfully used, that the plan "shall provide for
any class of creditors which is affected by and does not accept
the plan by the two-thirds majority in amount required under this
chapter, adequate protection for the realization by them of the
value of their claims against the property dealt with by the plan
and affected by such claims, either, as provided in the plan or in
the order confirming the plan . . . (d) by such method as will,
under and consistent with the circumstances of the particular
case, equitably and fairly provide such protection." '  The pro-
vision in the present section 77 which allows the plan to be con-
firmed by the court where the plan has not secured the required
two-thirds majority but the court finds that the plan treats fairly
those who have rejected it and the rejection was not reasonably
justified is also present in a modified form under the proposed
act.59 Acceptance or failure to accept when not in "good faith"
may be disregarded "for the purpose of determining the requisite
majority for the acceptance of a plan."60
Thus it may be said that chapter X looks towards an improved
reorganization practice by requiring the appointment of an inde-
pendent trustee, by placing the responsibility for the plan some-
what more directly on the court, by reducing the power of com-
mittees somewhat and making it easier for security holders to
know each other and appear in the proceedings, and by giving the
court and creditors and stockholders the advice of the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
The minor changes made by the chapter are numerous, and
to the practitioner they may at times seem more important. Some
of these may be enumerated.
Petitioning creditors must now have claims of $5,000 in
amount rather than only $1,000, although there is no longer any
requirement that the amount be above the security held by them
or that their claims be provable. 61 In addition the trustee under
the indenture may file. The creditors need not have claims
against the debtor itself, but may have claims against the debtor's
property only; this was somewhat doubtful under 77B. 2 It is now
58Sec. 216 (7). But they may not longer elect to take the value of the
securities allotted to them-at least it is no longer so specifically provided.
Thus the end of the dictum in Coriell v. White (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1931) 54 F.
(2d) 255.50Sec. 77 (e).60Sec. 203.6tSec.126.62See Matter of Draco Realty Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 405.
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clear that the provisions of the bankruptcy act apply, for instance
as to a 21a examination, prior to the approval of the petition. 63
This, too, was somewhat doubtful under the peculiar and con-
flicting wording of subsections (k) and (o) of 77B. The power
to extend time limits under the act 4 and to determine the manner
of giving notice has been made explicit." The judge now is given
the power to refer matters not expressly requiring his action to a
referee where a final determination may be made, rather than only
to a referee as special master whose report would have to be
confirmed.' The exemption granted under 77B to municipally
owned corporations has been removed.
The place of incorporation is omitted as sufficient venue, but
the power of the court to transfer the proceedings to any district
regardless of whether that might have been the place of original
venue is made clear.' 7 The idea of the supremacy of the debtor's
petition is removed with the provision that a petition may be filed
only if no other petition by or against the corporation has been
filed: the first petition thus prevails.' s The requirement that a
creditors' petition show an act of bankruptcy or a pending bank-
ruptcy or equity receivership pending has been expanded.60 Prior
bankruptcy proceeding has been made more definite so that there
mut already have been an adjudication in bankruptcy. "Prior
equity receivership pending," in order to avoid the Duparquet°
and Turtlk1 Cases, has been expanded to include the case where
a receiver or trustee has been appointed in equity proceedings to
take over at least the greater portion of the property, or where there
has been a foreclosure proceeding to enforce a lien against at
least the greater portion of the property. or where an indenture
trustee or a mortgagee is in possession of at least the greater
portion of the property by reason of default. The right to imme-
diate possession is given to the trustee or the debtor in posses-
sion as against trustees under a trust deed or under a mortgage .1 2
SSec. 112. See Matter of Fox Metropolitan Playhouses, Inc., (C.C.A.
2d Cir. 1935) 74 F. (2d) 722.
'Stc. 119.
"'Sec. 120. Why does not the act require special notice as to the hear-






"Duparquet, Huot & Moneuse v. Evans. (1936) 297 U. S. 216, 56 Sup.
Ct. 412, 80 L. Ed. 591.71Tuttle v. Harris, (1936) 297 U. S. 225, 56 Sup. Ct. 416, 80 L. Ed. 654.
rCf. In re Francis Willard. (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 804.
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Any creditor, indenture trustee or stockholder if the debtor is
not insolvent may controvert the allegations of the petition."3
The requirement of good faith is negatively defined in accordance
with the cases under 77B.74 We may note particularly that the
petition is not in good faith if it is unreasonable to expect that a
plan of reorganization be effected, or if a prior proceeding is
pending and it appears that the interests of the creditors and
stockholders would be best subserved in that prior proceeding."
It is now expressly provided that the trustee under the indenture
may file claims for his security holders who have not already
filed, but these claims are not to be counted in order to deter-
mine the majority necessary for acceptance of a plan."M
II
At the outset it was said that section 77B was defective in
two general ways. The second way had to do with the failure of
the section to provide adequate means for informing the security
holders as to the plan of reorganization, and the inadequacy of
devices for controlling a strong minority which might lead a dis-
organized, uninformed and possibly frightened majority. To a
large extent chapter X has cured this defect. But the first way
in which section 77B was inadequate was in its treatment of the
fair plan. The lack of statutory standards as to what constitutes
a fair plan had led to a good deal of confusion as to what treat-
ment an intermediate class could demand, and some confusion as
to what objections a minority could raise where the majority had
approved the plan of reorganization. Now contrary to what may
be thought to be the implications of Justice Brandeis' dissenting
opinion in the International News Service Case,77 some persons
might believe that, rather than statutory standards, it would be
better to have the courts work out the appropriate standard from
case to case. But over a period of years this has not been done.
The failure of chapter X further to elaborate the standards for a
73Sec. 137. Cf. In re 1030 North Dearborn Bldg. Corp., (E.D. I11.
1934) 7 F. Supp. 896.
74Sec. 146.
7rThe petition is not in good faith if "the petitioning creditors have
acquired their claims for the purpose of filing the petition." Thus the adon-
tion of In re Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., (D.C. Pa. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 51,
affd. in Wilson v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1934)
73 F. (2d) 1022. But why?
7GSec. 198. Cf. Matter of Allied Owners Corp., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1934)
74 F. (2d) 201.
-International News Service v. Associated Press, (1918) 248 U. S. 215,
248, 267, 39 Sup. Ct. 68, 63 L. Ed. 211, 2 A. L. R. 293.
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"fair and equitable" plan seems to be a mistake. It may be
thought that the Securities and Exchange Commission may do
the elaborating in the series of reports which it may issue. If
so this puts an unnecessary burden on the Commission.
In the eminently commercial matter of what constitutes the
minimum standards for a fair plan in reorganization, it is more
important that the law be certain than which way it be decided.
If the law is certain, security holders may know the attributes of
the securities which they are buying. The fact that stocks and
bonds are today treated very much alike in the investment mar-
ket 7 is probably not so much a reason for confusing the two in
reorganization as the result of years of indifferent treatment in
reorganizations. Unsound financing through second mortgages
again probably has been furthered by the lack of a clear position
as to the treatment of subordinate securities in reorganizations.
In arriving at the standard which the legislature should set, reason-
ing based upon the rights of security holders upon bankruptcy or
foreclosure if they should insist upon their rights is again some-
what beside the point.- That kind of argument opens the way
to the discussion of what kind of right it is which in most cases
the individual security holder in a large reorganization can never
insist upon. The history is interesting, but what we need is a
definite standard.
Since one thesis of this article is the need for a ministry of
justice to aid in the draftsmanship of statutes, it must recognize
the great and peculiar difficulties which the creation of statutory
rules presents. It is only in the most tentative way, therefore,
and merely to present something concrete, that the following
amendment is proposed to chapter X, section 221 (2) :
"(2) The plan is fair and equitable, and feasible. Without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, no subordinate class of
security holders shall be allowed participation if prior classes have
not received full recognition of the value of their interests in the
assets. 'Full recognition' shall be determined with reference to
the going concern value of the enterprise. Interest or dividend
payments may be modified with reference to the current return on
investments. Participation of a subordinate class will not make a
plan unfair, however, if the prior class not receiving full recogni-
tion has voted to accept the plan by the majority required under
this act."
7
RSee Isaacs, Business Security and Legal Security, (1923) 37 Harv. L.
Re:v. 201.
7"Levi ard Moore were guilty of this kind of discussion in their articles
in (1938) 5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
19
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This suggested amendment would enact into law the Boyd
Case, applying it to the cases where creditors are the most sub-
ordinate class permitted entrance as well as where stockholders
are in the bottom class. It would apply the Boyd Case even when
there is no equity for the intermediate class. It makes it clear
that the intermediate class may insist upon payment in full be-
fore any subordinate class may receive anything, but it also makes
it clear that the wishes of the required majority of the class are
to prevail. The amendment does not insist upon absolute priority
as upon liquidation; it does permit reference to the going concern
value of the enterprise, which in turn must take into consideration
the possibility of future earnings. Thus it does allow for some-
thing of a moratorium as to principal, with interest rate modified
with reference to the current return on investments.
Probably the chief reason for desiring a clear statement as to
what the positions of securities in reorganizations is to be is that
security holders may know the kind of securities which they are
purchasing. An additional reason is the desire for simplicity in
handling reorganizations. Both knowledge on the part of security
holders and simplicity in handling reorganizations is impossible,
however, if the varied types of hybrid securities is permitted
to continue. It is unfortunate that state corporation or security
regulation laws have not seen fit to limit the types of securities
which may be issued, more than they have. Possibly the only
solution will be through some kind of federal incorporation act.Y
Meanwhile, however, hybrid securities are matters of real concern
so far as the bankruptcy law is concerned.
A fair plan should mean one under which no securities are
issued as to which the knowledge of security holders as to their
future rights is of necessity vague. Chapter X has made some
progress in handling this portion of the fair plan problem. The
charter of the reorganized corporation must now include
"provisions which are fair and equitable and in accordance with
sound business and accounting practice, with respect to the terms,
positions, rights and privileges of the several classes of securities
of the debtor or of such corporation, including, without limiting
the generality of the foregoing, provisions with respect to the
issuance, acquisition, purchase retirement, or redemption of any
such securities, and the declaration and payment of dividends
thereon .. ."8
8 The Public -Utility Holding Company Act has done more for outlining
the proper corporate structure. See (1937) 15 U. S. C. A. 79g.8
'Sec. 216 (12).
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It is suggested in Chapter X that for obligations of more than five
years provisions be made for the retirement of the debt out of a
sinking fund or otherwise, (a) if secured, within the expected use-
ful life of the security therefor, or (b) if unsecured, or if the ex-
pected useful life of the security is not fairly ascertainable, then
within a specified reasonable time, not to exceed forty years."8 2
It is required that the plan
"shall include provisions which are equitable, compatible with the
interests of creditors and stockholders, and consistent with public
policy, with respect to the manner of selection of the persons
who are to be directors, officers, or voting trustees, if any, upon
the consummation of the plan and their respective successors."' 3
It is required that the new charter have provisions prohibiting the
debtor from issuing non-voting stock, and providing protection
for the preferred stockholders in the event of default."4 And it
is also required that the charter of the new corporation have
provisions for the making of periodic reports-at least annually-
which will include profit and loss statements and balance sheets
"prepared in accordance with sound business and accounting
practice whenever the indebtedness of the debtor is $250,000 or
over."
While these provisions constitute a step forward, again the
objection which must be made to them is that they are too vague.
It is again true that the Securities and Exchange Commission
through its reports may mold future corporation practices into
something more definite. If so, however, we may expect an era
of somewhat increased irritation between business men and the
administrative commission. 6 For the sake of the life of the
commission itself it is important to minimize such irritations when
it is possible to set up certain standards and thus avoid putting the
commission in the position of bargaining. Therefore again in the
most tentative manner, a suggested amendment is offered to chap-
ter X, section 216 (12) (a)
'"Sec. 216 (9).
s3Sec. 216 (11). See also sec. 221 (5).44Sec. 216 (12) (a).
8rSec. 216 (12) (b) (2).86,. . .the most important point in the development of administrative law
is the reduction of discretion," Freund, Historical Survey, in The Growth
of American Administrative Law 24. But one need not take that somewhat
unpopular position in order to argue for standards when the very purpose
of the regulation is to educate the community to have higher standards. The
pusition taken in the above proposed amendment so far as the Boyd case
is concerned is similar to that outlined by Mr. Abe Fortas, assistant
director of the Public Utilities Division of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in his address at the Hotel Astor, July 14, 1938.
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"Provisions which limit the securities of the corporation to
(1) common stock with voting rights; (2) non-participating pre-
ferred stock with cumulative dividends whether or not earned, with
the right to elect at least the majority of directors in the event
that preferred dividends are unpaid and at least until accrued
dividends are paid, unsecured obligations, (3) unsecured obliga-
tions, and (4) secured first lien obligations. Income bonds not
making provisions for interest to be cumulative if earned shall
be prohibited. The public offering of unsecured obligations shall
be prohibited if secured obligations are outstanding, and secured
obligations shall be prohibited if there has been a public offering
of unsecured obligations."
This suggested and tentative amendment would simplify the
capital structure of companies in general. It may be that par-
ticular types of companies should have their capital structures
further simplified, but that would involve special problems which
a general bankruptcy act could not hope to handle. The amend-
ment would do much to solve the difficulties of at least peculiar
treatment of the preferred stock at the hands of the common. It
would wipe out second mortgages. Through its treatment of in-
come bonds it would do much to simplify for the ordinary in-
vestor the difference between bonds and stocks. If the sug-
gested amendment seems too rigid, it might be wise to permit
exceptions where the need for them is shown.
III
It is undoubtedly ungracious in the case of a chapter such as
the one with which we are dealing to say that in places it is poorly
drafted. The poor draftsmanship in most cases is the direct
result of strenuous efforts to improve the law, and it may be
suspected that without certain ambiguities some improvements
would fail of passage by the legislature. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant that statute law be consistent and understandable.,, Chap-
ter X is an example of quick draftsmanship which in many cases
could have been improved if persons removed from the struggle
to gain the substantive changes in the law effected by the statute
and concerned only with its technical aspect had been required
to pass upon it. Such would be one of the duties of a federal
ministry of justice, a proposal which might be thought somewhat
timely after almost a decade of extensive revision of our statutory
law in a somewhat haphazard manner. Such a ministry would
be a fitting memorial to Mr. Justice Cardozo."8
87See Freund, Standards of American Legislation, (1917) ch. VI.8&See Cardozo, Law and Literature, the chapter, A Ministry of Justice.
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
Meanwhile it must be admitted that chapter X has many
ambiguities and defects. In the first place it is not even known
when the chapter takes effect. Section 7 of the amendatory act
states that the amendments shall take effect three months from
the date of approval of the act. The act was approved on June
22, 1938. But section 276c of chapter X provides for the appli-
cation of the chapter to proceedings before the effective date of the
act. Where the petition was filed within three months prior to the
effective date then "the provisions of this chapter shall apply in
their entirety to such proceedings." If the petition in the pro-
ceedings was approved more than three months prior to the effec-
tive date, then "the provisions of this chapter shall apply to such
proceedings to the extent that the judge shall deem their applica-
tion practicable." Two interpretations are possible. Perhaps the
simplest interpretation would be that the chapter does not apply
at all until after the effective date. After the effective date, it
applies to proceedings which were commenced previously-the
application is compulsory to those begun within three months, dis-
cretionary with proceedings begun more than three months before.
A more complicated interpretation is that since the act applies
in its "entirety" to proceedings begun within three months-the
chapter becomes effective as to them as to procedure and sub-
stantive law during those three months as well as later. This
more complicated interpretation was rejected by the United States
district court of the southern district, California, in In re Con-
solidated National Corporation.8 3 The court pointed out that such
an interpretation would require the application of the act if the
petition was approved within the three months period, but the pro-
ceedings were no longer pending before the effective date of the
Act. The difficulties and confusion that the second method of
interpretation would entail caused it to be rejected. But the
circuit court in the third circuit in Bankers Securities Corp. v.
Rita Carlton Restaurant and Hotel Ca. has adopted the more
complicated view that the section was immediately applicable to
proceedings begun during the three month period. Thus in the
hearing on the petition, notices would have to be sent to the
Securities and Exchange Commission and a disinterested trustee
would have to be appointed.
Somewhat similar difficulties apply to section 276c (3) which
8'1C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. Dec. 51,365.
1-C. C. H. Bank. Serv. Dec. 51,367. Cf. In re Old Algiers, Inc.
(U.S. D.C. N.Y. Sept. 30, 1938). C. C. H. 51,387.
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makes the tax exemption provision applicable to reorganizations
where plans have been "confirmed under section 77B before the
effective date of this amendatory act." How retroactive is that
provision supposed to be?
The provisions for process are not as clear as they might be.
Under section 77, process runs throughout the countryY' It had
been thought that the same might well be true of section 77B.
The present chapter does not specify. It is possible to argue that
process does run throughout the country, but if it does it is be-
cause of the vague provisions of section 2(15), present in the old
bankruptcy act as well, which gives the court power to ". . . issue
such process . .. as may be necessary for the enforcement of this
act." The necessity for a plenary proceeding, as opposed to
summary jurisdiction, and the powers of the reorganization court
in a plenary proceeding are still vague. The courts have denied
the reorganization court the right to exercise jurisdiction in
actions in personam where hardship against individual defendants
would be great, but chapter X does nothing to clarify the rules 2
Similarly just when it will be an abuse of discretion for the re-
organization court to stay state court proceedings for the liquida-
tion of individual claims is not made clear under the amended
act.93
The United States Supreme Court held, in the Chicago Title
and Trust Company Case, that a dissolved corporation might not
file a voluntary petition under section 77B. 4  The court ex-
pressly refused to rule on the question of whether an involuntary
petition could be filed against such a corporation. That a distinc-
tion might be made in this connection between voluntary and in-
voluntary petitions had been indicated in some of the cases, and the
seventh circuit, which had previously allowed creditors to file
against a dissolved corporation, has, since the Chicago Title and
Trust Company Case, reaffirmed its position.93  And the federal
district court in Minnesota has allowed a corporation to file where
91Sec. 77 (a).92There is Thomas v. Winslow, (D.C. N.Y. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 839,
where extraterritorial jurisdiction was held good, and Bovay v. Bylisby,
(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1937) 88 F. (2d) 990, and United States v. Tacoma Oriental
S. S. Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 363 where it was not. Note the
discussion in In re Prima Co. (C.C.A. 7th Cir. Aug. 26, 1938) C. C. H.
Bankr. Serv. Dec. 51,323.93See Foust v. Munson Steamship Lines, (1936) 299 U. S. 77, 56 Sup.
Ct. 751, 80 L. Ed. 1378.94Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. 4136 Wilcox Bldg. Corp., (1937) 302
U. S. 120.951n re Park Beach Hotel Corp., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 886.
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its charter was allowed to lapse, but where, unlike the Chicago
Title and Trust Company Case, the period allowed for corporate
powers to be utilized for winding up the corporation's affairs had
not elapsed." In the absence of any clarifying words in the
present chapter, litigation on both of these points will continue.
The same must be said for eleemosynary corporations. 7 It is
still not clear whether an involuntary petition may be filed against
them.
The relationship between chapter X and chapter XI of the
present act is not well thought out. Chapter XI is a combination
of the old composition section of the bankruptcy act, section 12,
and of the special section for the relief of unincorporated debtors,
section 74. Chapter XI is now open to both incorporated and
unincorporated debtors; the theory of the chapter seems to be
that it" will take care of the milder forms of readjustments, since
under the chapter secured claims may not even be extended. Be-
fore a petition may be filed in good faith under chapter X. it
must be shown that adequate relief could not be obtained under
chapter I But if creditors can be denied relief for this reason
under chapter X, they are left in a peculiar position if their peti-
tion is really dismissed for this reason, for they may not then pro-
ceed to file under chapter XI. Only voluntary petitions are allowed
under chapter XI. Further, if the theory is that chapter XI is to
take care of the milder readjustments, it is strange that the chapter
makes no provisions for the modification of the rights of stock-
holders. In other ways the policy of chapter XI cannot be called
consistent with that expressed in chapter X. The appointment
Of a trustee is not mandatory, nor need the trustee be disinterested.
Committees or trustees under indentures are not even mentioned,
The good faith requirement for petitions is omitted. Only the
debtor may propose a plan. In other respects chapter XI is con-
fusing. Class voting is authorized, but the division into classes
is possibly to be determined only by the treatment of the classes
under the planY'0 Only claims provided for in the plan are to be
discharged,""° but it is also provided that the plan is to be binding
on all claims whether they are provided for in the plan or not.'
""In the Matter of International Sugar Feed Co., (D.C. Minn. 1938) 23
F. Supp. 197.
971n re Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, (D.C. Mich. 1937)






In one respect the good faith requirements under chapter X
are somewhat unfortunate. It may be expected that because of
the prohibition against assents procured before a plan of reor-
ganization has been approved by the court, some reorganizers will
prefer state court proceedings. Unless what goes on under state
court proceedings is a matter of no concern to federal legislators,
it is not particularly wise to set up requirements which are higher
than those in the state courts, and then provide a means whereby
reorganizers can keep their proceedings from the federal courts.
But the requirement that it be reasonable to expect that a plan
can be effected, and that the interests of creditors and stock-
holders be not best subserved by continuing in proceedings pend-
ing in another court, may leave the door open to the claim of
committees representing large numbers of the depositors that
they will not consent to a plan of reorganization in the federal
court, and that the petition is therefore filed in bad faith.
The uncertainty as to the proper division for class voting which
has existed ever since section 77B was enacted has not been clarified.
The standards for a fair plan which the chapter enacts already have
been mentioned. The requirement that the new corporation have
in its charter provisions against non-voting stock is not clear, how-
ever. After the provision against non-voting stock, section 216
(12) (a) goes on to say that the voting power shall be equitably
distributed so as to give preferred stockholders the right to elect
directors in the case of default. The section is open to the in-
terpretation that the right to vote on default makes a stock voting
stock, and that no other voting rights need be given. Further the
right to elect directors does not necessarily mean the right to elect
the majority of the directors. The position of six months claims
is highly uncertain under the chapter as it now stands. Unsecured
claims are no longer specifically entitled to the priority which they
would have had under equity receiverships, and the provisions of
section 64, relating to priorities in ordinary bankruptcy, are spe-
cifically made inapplicable. The priority which may be given to
receiver's certificates or trustee's certificates, which was held by
the seventh circuit to be extended under section 77B,'1 2 is not
clarified either.
It is to be regretted that the amended bankruptcy act does noth-
ing about the position of the guarantor where the debtor is in re-
organization. Section 16 of the act, which prevents the discharge
of a guarantor or surety because the principal debtor is discharged
7
0 21n re Prima Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1937) 88 F. (2d) 785.
CORPORATE REORG.JNIZ.ATION
in bankruptcy remains unchanged. It has been held that the
guarantor is not discharged as against creditors who have been
forced into the reorganization." Presumably the guarantor is
discharged as against creditors who voluntarily accept a plan of
reorganization which provides for release of the surety, although
it has also been held that such creditors may preserve their rights
by specifically reserving their rights against an indorser.101 The
present situation is no more unfair to the guarantor than it is to
unsuspecting creditors.?' Creditors who accept a plan of re-
organization thinking that all creditors of their class will be bound
by the provisions of an accepted plan are being misled.
An attempt has been made through chapter X to relieve re-
organizations from the threat of taxation upon income which ap-
pears as a result of debts being wiped out.' 0 6 This was the case
for some reorganizations prior to chapter X. It is further under-
standable that together with the exemption of such reorganizations
from taxation on income resulting from the reorganization itself,
an attempt should be made to make it clear that income made after
the reorganization should not be exempt. Section 270 therefore
states that "in determining the basis of property for any purpose
... the basis of the debtor's property . . . shall be decreased by the
amount . . . by which the indebtedness of the debtor . . . has been
cancelled or reduced." If giving bondholders stock cancels or re-
wQ8In re Diversey Bldg. Corp. (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 456
and atter of Nine North Church Street (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d)
186. In (1937) 23 Va. L. Rev. 601, 602, it is stated that "Being dissenters,
they certainly have no agreement with the surety which might preclude a
personal action by them against the solvent surety." Note Seixas v. Hege-
man, (1935) 158 Misc. Rep. 560, 285 N. Y. S. 838, affd. in (1936) 285
N. Y. S. 840. The Illinois appellate court in Gottlieb v. Crowe, (1937) 289
I11. App. 595, 7 N. E. (2d) 469, held that the cancellation of the guarantor's
obligation by the federal court in reorganization proceedings was res adjudi-
cata and no separate action could be maintained in the state court. But the
Illinois supreme court reversed the decision. Gottlieb v. Crowe, (1938) 308
I11. 88, 12 N. E. (2d) 881. The plaintiff had filed a petition in the district
court asking that the cancellation order be modified. The United States
Supreme Court has just held that the order of the federal court was binding
on the state court, even though "we express no opinion as to whether the
Bankruptcy Court did or did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter."
Stoll v. Gottlieb (U.S. Sup. Ct. Nov. 21, 1938) C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. Dec.
51,466.
-"1Durfee Trust Co. v. Steiger, (Mass. 1936) 4 N. E. (2d) 1014.
"-The guarantor may have subrogation in order to avoid difficulties of
valuation. Thus Union Trust Co. of Rochester v. Willsea, (1937) 275 N. Y.
164, 9 N. E. (2d) 820, 112 A. L. R. 1175, where the guarantor remained liable
although the plan "provided for payment in full to its creditors by the
issuance of 5,000 shares of a new first preferred class A, 5 per cent cumula-
tive stock," because "for all that appears it may have no value." The court
said subrogation would be allowed the guarantor to the stock when he paid.
1'3Sec. 268.
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duces the indebtedness of the debtor,'then under this provision a
corporation owning real estate once worth a million dollars, and
now only worth one half a million, will discover itself in a peculiar
position if it reorganizes by giving the bondholders stock. A later
sale of the property for one fourth of a million only will result in
income. This may be avoided by the argument that there is no
cancellation, for stock was given, and that a reduction can only be
determined by a valuation of the property. The provision that the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is to prescribe regulations to
carry "into effect the purposes of this section" may also be the
means of rectifying the defect °.1 0 a
One of the troublesome matters under section 77B was the need
for determining for the purposes of appeal whether the order ap-
pealed from was an order given in a "proceeding" or in a "con-
troversy" in bankruptcy. It has been said that the need for the
distinction is done away with under the amended act. This is not
the case. While appeals are as of right where more than $500 is
involved in both proceedings and in controversies, where inter-
locutory decrees are concerned appeal is of right under the present
act only when the interlocutory decree is in a controversy, but not
where it is in a proceeding.107
Finally it is to be regretted that while the fee provisions have
been considerably expanded, the bothersome question as to the
powers of the reorganization court over fees set in prior proceed-
ings is not clarified. The case law seems to be moving to the posi-
tion that the reorganization court may modify the allowed fees if
a direction to pay was not given in the prior proceeding, but this
is a matter that could be taken care of easily in a reorganization
statute.108
lOSaBut the regulation of the Commissioner, T. D. 4871, Nov. 9, 1938,
Art. 113(b)-2, C. C. H. Fed. Tax Serv. 802A, does not seem to clarify
matters, although by failing to make an exception for the case where
bondholders take stock, it may be thought that the Commissioner will not
remedy the defect in the statute. The regulations under section 112(b) (8)
of the Revenue Act of 1938, T. D. 4874, Nov. 16, 1938, C. C. H. Fed. Tax
Serv. 6624 are of some weight in favor of strict construction, although
these regulations apply to exchanges and distributions made in obedience
to ofders of the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with
holding companies. The attempts which must follow to remedy this defect
in draftsmanship illustrate the theme of this article. Spurious interpreta-
tion or unsound financing will be the children of this defect if the legis-
lature does not remedy it.1'0 Weinstein recognizes this to be the case in his book on The Bank-
ruptcy Law of 1938, and in Report No. 1409, July 29, 1937, on the Revision
of the National Bankruptcy Act. See also the discussion in the Hearings
on H. R. 6439 and H. R. 8046, 78.CsThus In re Shorewater Corporation, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938) 94 F.
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It is obvious that the defects of chapter X do not nullify its
merits. The attempt which the chapter makes to control the inner
practices of reorganizations is an achievement against which
criticism of the defects of the chapter are petty. The statute how-
ever stands in need of amendment. Poor draftsmanship in numer-
ous cases will be inevitable until some practical attention is given
to the need for a federal ministry of justice which will study pro-
posed federal bills for the discovery of technical errors, lack of
uniformity, and will report to the legislature gaps and ambiguities
in statutes revealed by the interpretations of courts. When the
recommendations of Professor Freund and Mr. Justice Cardozo
are followed in this respect, we may expect an improvement in our
statutes. It is true, of course, that to deprive some provisions of
their ambiguities would result in their defeat, but against that must
be set the doubtful character of the victory which the proponents
of a statute achieve when its provisions are capable of emasculating
interpretations. The confusion of issues and tremendous waste
in litigation is the result of the practices now pursued. It goes
without saying that proper statutory draftsmanship would also be
easier if cooperation between the bar and the law schools were
better established, and if the bar itself took its duties somewhat
more seriously. The reports of bar association committees have
not always showed an acquaintanceship with the legislative bills
which they criticize.
(2d) 261, 262: ". . . where the state court has entertained a final judgment
in a foreclosure proceeding, with a direction as to the payment of the same,
a federal court is bound by such judgment." This was not a holding because
the court felt that the district court in denying the fee had acted arbitrarily
anyway.
